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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-COPYRIGHT & INTERNET LAW--"THE
BIG CHILL": THE SUPREME COURT ADOPTS AN INDUCEMENT STANDARD
FOR THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY, LEAVING
INNOVATION IN THE COLD. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
Resolution of the question presented here will largely determine the
value, indeed the very significance, of copyright in the digital era.'
Reconciling the interrelationship and ongoing struggle between the
rights of copyright holders and those who develop new technologies has
been a topic of concern since the advent of copyrights.2 Technological inno-
vation and copyrights are generally seen as being in conflict, with copyright
pitted against progress. The rights of copyright holders are often put into
jeopardy when some types of new technologies are introduced, for example,
the printing press, photocopier, and VCR. ' Technological innovation re-
quires sufficient incentive to develop and appropriate time to cultivate legal
markets.5 In this regard, a copyright system that is too protective will stifle
the flow of capital into developing new technologies.6 In addition, a copy-
right system that is uncertain regarding the potential for liability will chill
innovation.7 Conversely, it is argued that a weak copyright system will not
encourage and promote artistic expression and information distribution,
thereby depriving the public of creative output.8 Weak copyright law may
1. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).
2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); Jane
C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM.
L. REv. 1613,1613 (2001).
3. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1613.
4. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I17), 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2791-92 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
5. Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New
Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 442 (2005); see also GEOFFREY A. MOORE,
CROSSING THE CHASM 12-13, 30-49 (1999).
6. See Brief for Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors and the
United States Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).
7. See id.
8. See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1614.
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even suppress business development, without which many useful technolo-
gies would never be developed.9
A key feature of an effective copyright system is to provide protection
against infringement that is consistent with a copyright's goal: to "promote.
. . useful Arts. ' Thus, for the overall public good, it is vital to achieve a
proper balance between protecting authors' works as an incentive to create
and the public's interest in accessing both creative works and new technol-
ogy. I" The outcome of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
(Grokster II),12 and the resulting business and legal developments, created
ambiguity and doubt regarding potential liability in the copyright system
that is having a deleterious effect on technical innovation and investment.
This Note addresses the current confusion surrounding contributory li-
ability for copyright infringement after the Supreme Court's decision in
Grokster III and the decision's failure to clarify a split among the circuit
courts regarding the application of the safe-harbor defense to contributory
liability for copyright infringement adopted in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.13 Part II of this Note outlines the facts and pro-
cedural history; 4 Part III contains the background and historical develop-
ment of relevant copyright law, with an emphasis on the development of
contributory liability, the safe-harbor doctrine adopted in Sony, 5 and the
emerging split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits regarding the inter-
pretation of the Sony doctrine. 6 Part W analyzes the unanimous opinion of
the United States Supreme Court in Grokster III in which the Court adopted
an inducement standard for third-party copyright infringement liability, and
the conflict between Justice Ginsburg's and Justice Breyer's concurring
opinions on the correct interpretation of the Sony doctrine.' 7 Part V empha-
sizes that, without action by Congress or the courts to clarify the boundaries
of legal liability, the ambiguity left by the Supreme Court's failure in Grok-
9. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Coun-
tries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 461 (2001).
10. UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter Copyright Clause or Patent and
Copyright Clause]. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
11. Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2792-94 (Breyer, J., concurring); Ginsburg, supra note 2,
at 1614; Lior Zemer, Rethinking Copyright Alternatives, 14 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 137,
137, 139 (2006).
12. 125 S. Ct. 2764.
13. Id. at 2764; 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
14. See infra Part II.
15. 464U.S. 417.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
[Vol. 29
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ster III to resolve the split among the circuits regarding the application of
Sony will chill technological innovation and investment."8
II. FACTS
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1),19
a number of entertainment companies brought a complaint against the de-
fendants on the basis of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement
for distributing second-generation peer-to-peer file-sharing software to end
users who utilized the software to illegally share the plaintiffs' copyrighted
material with others.2°
Initially, this section focuses on the development of the first two gen-
erations of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing technology, the impact of the
technology on copyright holders, and the legal responses to the new tech-
nology as epitomized by A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster i/).21
Next, this section focuses on the specific facts that gave rise to the copyright
holders' suit for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.22 Fi-
nally, this section traces the procedural history of the Grokster litigation in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the ultimate grant
of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.23
A. Factual Background
1. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: The First Wave
In the fall of 1998, Shawn Fanning, a freshman at Northeastern Univer-
sity in Boston, developed software to solve a problem his roommate had
finding web sites for downloading digital music files.24 The available web
sites were hard to find, unreliable, and infrequently updated.25 In an attempt
18. See infra Part V.
19. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
20. Id. at 1032. Peer-to-peer software works by networking together a number of indi-
vidual, personal computers to provide access to files on them instead of storing the files on a
centralized server. John M. Moye, How Sony Survived: Peer-to-Peer Software, Grokster, and
Contributory Copyright Liability in the Twenty-First Century, 84 N.C. L. REv. 646, 660
(2006). In order for peer-to-peer software users to find files located on a peer computer in the
network, an index of files available on the network is maintained. Id.
21. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra Part II.A.I.
22. See infra Part II.A.2.
23. See infra Part I1.B.
24. Utah's Digital Economy and the Future: Peer-to-Peer and Other Emerging Tech-
nologies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 29 (2000) (testimony
of Shawn Fanning, Founder, Napster, Inc.) [hereinafter Fanning Testimony].
25. Id.
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to solve these issues, Fanning developed software to locate and transfer digi-
tal music files in MPEG-3 (MP3) format26 from other individuals' personal
computers that were connected to the Internet.27 In order to create a search-
able database of available files, users of Fanning's software would send
information about files they were willing to share to a centralized server.2"
Users could then use the server to search for particular files and download
those files directly from the computer hosting the file.29 The peer-to-peer
file-sharing software that Fanning developed was named MusicShare, and it
formed the basis for Napster, Inc.3° Within a year of the software's public
release in the summer of 1999," 1 the number of MusicShare users swelled to
twenty million and to over fifty million by the time the Ninth Circuit issued
its injunction.32
P2P software, which allows users to exchange files directly with other
users on the Internet, can be used to share any type of digital file. 33 How-
ever, the primary use for Napster's software, essentially unchanged from
Fanning's original version of MusicShare, was illegally trading MP3 music
26. MP3 music files are created when a user copies (i.e., "rips") music from an audio
compact disc (CD) onto his or her computer hard drive in the compressed MP3 format. Nap-
ster II, 239 F.3d at 1011. This compressed audio "format allows for rapid transmission of
digital audio files from one computer to another." Id.
27. Fanning Testimony, supra note 24, at 33.
28. Id.
29. NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1011. Fanning's software allowed its users to "(1) make MP3
music files stored on individual computer hard drives available for copying by other Napster
users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other users' computers; and (3) transfer exact
copies of the contents of other users' MP3 files from one computer to another via the Inter-
net." Id. This direct user-to-user sharing of files is termed peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing.
Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005). P2P file sharing is
so called because users' computers communicate directly with each other ....
Because they need no central computer server to mediate the exchange of infor-
mation or files among users, the high-bandwidth communications capacity for a
server may be dispensed with, and the need for costly server storage space is
eliminated... [and] copies of a file.., are available on many users' computers.
Id.
30. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901, 905
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
31. Fanning Testimony, supra note 24, at 33.
32. Christopher Jensen, Your iPod Is Safe, but: A Provisional Assessment of the Su-
preme Court's Grokster Decision, 9 J. INTERNET L. 28 (2005). Senator Orrin Hatch, making a
statement after the Ninth Circuit's decision, put the number of users higher, saying that "or-
dering the lower court to impose a preliminary injunction before a trial on the merits...
could have the effect of shutting down Napster entirely, depriving more than [fifty] million
consumers access to a music service they have enjoyed." Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch on
the Ninth Circuit Decision in the Napster Case Feb. 14, 2001, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/ogh021401 nap.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
33. Napster's software was originally developed specifically for trading music files.
Fanning Testimony, supra note 24, at 29.
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files.34 Faced with a vast amount of allegedly infringing activity taking place
by the software's users,35 A&M Records and seventeen other record compa-
nies sued Napster for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement
liability in December 1999-little more than a year after Fanning began
work on the MusicShare software. 36 The Northern District of California de-
termined that Napster's central business strategy was to facilitate the unau-
thorized exchange of copyrighted music.3 7 The court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined Napster from operating its
business.38 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the "district court's conclusion that plaintiffs [had] demonstrated a likeli-
hood of success on the merits of [their] contributory copyright infringement
claim., 39 In addition, the court concluded that Napster had both knowingly
and materially contributed to its users' infringing activities by providing and
monitoring the "site and facilities" for direct infringement-the indexing
and search servers.40 For all practical purposes, Napster was out of busi-
ness.
41
2. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: The Second Wave
A number of P2P file-sharing software companies sprang up in Nap-
ster's place, including Grokster, StreamCast, and KaZaa, all vying to be "the
next Napster. '4 2 They intended to avoid Napster's fate by doing away with
the centralized indexing and search servers, the source of liability in Napster
11.
43
34. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911 ("[V]irtually all Napster users engage in the unau-
thorized downloading or uploading of copyrighted music.").
35. The estimate given during the Napster case was that twelve to thirty million songs
were being downloaded per day. John Gibeaut, Facing the Music: You Say You Want a Revo-
lution? Well, the Napster Case and Others Herald the Beginning of a Technological Rebel-
lion That May Alter Traditional Concepts of Copyright Law, 86 A.B.A. J. 36, 38 (2000).
36. NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
37. Id. at 918.
38. Id. at 927.
39. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). The court also concluded that the
plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on their vicarious copyright infringement claim. Id.
at 1024 ("Napster's failure to police the system's 'premises,' combined with a showing that
Napster financially benefits from the continuing availability of infringing files on its system,
leads to the imposition of vicarious liability.").
40. Id. at 1022-23.
41. Napster R.I.P. Music File-Swapping. (Napster Dies, but Its Clones Live on),
ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2002, at 56.
42. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2773 (2005).
43. 239 F.3d 1004; Maria Termini, Time-Shifting in the Internet Age: Peer-to-Peer
Sharing of Television Content, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 415, 430 (2005) ("Second-
generation P2P software rose to take Napster's place. The second-generation software is
tailored to avoid the legal problems Napster had encountered.").
2006]
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KaZaa developed the peer-to-peer software, which it initially licensed
to the other defendants, who distributed branded versions." Unlike Nap-
ster,45 Grokster's software did not utilize a centralized server to maintain an
index of the files available on the system; instead, the system used the net-
work of user computers for searching.46
While Grokster, StreamCast, and KaZaa all began using the same P2P
network protocol,47 StreamCast later modified its software to utilize the
Gnutella P2P network protocol.48 Users who installed software compatible
with either protocol would be able to trade files with others on the same
protocol's P2P network.49 In the FastTrack network, instead of a centralized
server, some computers on the network would be temporarily designated
"supernodes," which would collect and index the files available on a seg-
ment of the network.5° A search for a file would query a supernode, which
would then instruct other supernodes to process the search and return partial
results to the original supemode where they would be aggregated and deliv-
ered to the user, thus making the indexing and search functionality an
autonomous, distributed system.5 Some of the Gnutella protocol had no
supemodes or a centralized index; rather, search requests were passed from
user to user until results were found or there were no other connected
peers.52
In marketing their software, StreamCast also distributed a program
compatible with the Napster P2P network, OpenNap, which was used to
collect marketing information about Napster's users.53 StreamCast used this
harvested information, which included mostly e-mail addresses, in order to
44. Termini, supra note 43, at 431. "Grokster distributed a branded version of the Kazaa
Media Desktop based on FastTrack while Streamcast [later] offered its own proprietary soft-
ware, Morpheus, based on the open-source Gnutella protocol." Tussey, supra note 5, at 464
n. 199 (citing Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032-33 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
45. See supra Part II.A.1.
46. Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REv. 859, 865 (2004).
47. In a pure P2P network protocol there are no servers or centralized control systems.
Duncan Campbell, Transfer Report: Design Information Push Research, Research Centre at
the University of Bath, at 27 (Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://www.bath.ac.uk/
-enpdrc/Docs/tr.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). Each peer on the network is capable of both
initiating communication and being the subject of a request. Id. A peer is also able to leave or
enter the network at any time. Id. This is unlike the more conventional client/server network
model in which there is a rigid distinction of roles between the client nodes and the server
nodes. Id.
48. Grokster 11, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2773.
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market the StreamCast system to these former Napster users.54 The Court
recognized that the "OpenNap program ... was designed, as its name im-
plied, to invite the custom of patrons of Napster, then under attack in the
courts for facilitating massive infringement. 5 5 Grokster and StreamCast's
software contained advertising space that generated revenue based on the
number of advertising viewers6 Both companies' goal was to increase the
use of their software, thereby increasing their advertising revenue.57
Like Napster, the record developed in the cases against Grokster and
StreamCast indicated that a majority of the activity on their networks was
for the illegal trading of music files on a massive scale." Over 100 million
copies of the defendants' software had been downloaded by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court. 9 Although, in Grokster III, the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) stated that creating digital versions
of a compact disk (CD) for personal use was permissible,6 ° it has since
sought to qualify this statement.6'
54. Grokster 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2773.
55. Id. at 2780. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part IV.A.4.
56. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. at 2774.
57. Id. The record indicated that "both companies generate income by selling advertising
space .... As the number of users of each program increases, advertising opportunities be-
come worth more." Id.
58. Id. at 2772. A study commissioned by copyright holders indicated that "nearly
[ninety percent] of the files available for download on the FastTrack system were copyrighted
works." Id.; Brief for Respondents at 10 n.6, Grokster I1, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-
480). Grokster and StreamCast concede in their brief that most downloads were infringing.
Id. They stated that "[iut is undisputed that those who use Grokster and StreamCast in this
way are committing copyright infringement, and that this infringement constitutes at least
[ninety percent] of the activity on the services." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1,
at 1.
59. Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-
480) [hereinafter Grokster I1 Oral Argument]. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., counsel for Petitioner
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), stated as follows: "The record compa-
nies, my clients, have said, for some time now, and it's been on their Website for some time
now, that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your com-
puter, put it onto your iPod." Id.
61. The RIAA recently argued, contrary to its statement to the Supreme Court, that
space and format shifting, such as making digital copies of a CD you own, are infringing
uses:
Nor does the fact that permission to make a copy in particular circumstances is
often or even routinely granted, necessarily establish that the copying is a fair use
when the copyright owner withholds that authorization. In this regard, the state-
ment attributed to counsel for copyright owners in the MGM v. Grokster case is
simply a statement about authorization, not about fair use.
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Hearings, Copyright Office, 22 n.46 (2006) (Joint Reply Comments of RAA et al.);
see also Colbem C. Stuart, III & Matthew C. Lapple, MGM v. Grokster: Multimillion-Dollar
Questions That the Supreme Court Did Not Answer, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 19
2006]
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B. Procedural History
The Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. litigation
consolidated two cases brought by copyright holders against Grokster,
Streamcast, and KaZaa.6z Like Napster, the defendants distributed software
that allowed its users to exchange digital files, including music in the MP3
file format.63 In the litigation, both the district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that Sony's safe-harbor
doctrine provided Grokster and StreamCast a defense to contributory in-
fringement liability because their software was capable of substantial, com-
mercially significant, noninfringing uses.6' Two separate panels of judges in
the Ninth Circuit, though finding the same result, differed on the reason for
the result, leading to an intra-circuit split.
65
1. United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia
Beginning October 2, 2001, "[t]wenty-eight of the largest entertain-
ment companies in the world" filed complaints against Grokster, Stream-
Cast, and KaZaa on the same basis as in Napster: contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement liability.66 While Grokster and StreamCast were suc-
cessful in establishing a defense to infringement liability in the district court,
the district court entered a default judgment against KaZaa when the com-
pany ceased defending the action.6 1 Consequently, all judicial opinions per-
n.25 (2005) (stating that the "RIAA takes the position that much of the ripping, burning, is
infringement").
62. Robyn Axberg, File-Sharing Tools and Copyright Law: A Study of In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation and MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 35 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 389, 431
(2003).
63. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004),
aff'g 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); see also discus-
sion infra Part III.B.6.
64. Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157. In response to the decision, which held that the dis-
tributors of a product used primarily for massive, electronic copyright infringement could not
be held liable, Mary Beth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, said that it "threatens to dra-
matically undermine the effectiveness of copyright in the digital age." Mary Beth Peters, The
33d Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture Delivered at New York University School ofLaw on
April 29, 2004, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 701, 724 (2004); see also Jessica Litman, The
Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917, 918-19 (2005).
65. Kelly M. Maxwell, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do? A Critical Look at MGM
v. Grokster and the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P Copyright Infringement Standards,
13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 335, 349 (2005).
66. Stuart & Lapple, supra note 61, at 13-14. The cases were consolidated in the district
court. Grokster1, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
67. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1032. "Although Grokster, StreamCast and Kazaa...
independently branded, marketed[,] and distributed their respective software, all three plat-
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tained to Grokster and StreamCast exclusively. 68 In each instance, the soft-
ware being distributed was nearly identical in function to Napster's, the
primary difference being the lack of a centralized indexing server for locat-
ing files on the P2P network.69
On April 25, 2003, United States District Court Judge Stephen V. Wil-
son granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants Grokster and
StreamCast.7 ° Judge Wilson ruled that no genuine issues of fact were left to
try and that Grokster and StreamCast were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on the issue of contributory infringement liability based on the Sony
safe-harbor doctrine." In finding the software vendors not secondarily liable
for their users' infringing actions, the district court sided with Grokster and
StreamCast on both elements of contributory infringement: knowledge and
material contribution.72 For the knowledge element, the court emphasized
the timing of the knowledge.73 While noting that the defendants had actual
knowledge of its users' infringing activities, the court went on to say that the
acquisition of the knowledge must happen at a time when it can be used to
stop the infringement. 74 The court also held that Sony provided a complete
defense to the knowledge element because both potential and actual substan-
tial, noninfringing uses of the defendants' software existed, saying "it is
undisputed that there are substantial[,] noninfringing uses for Defendant's
software. 75 On the second element, the court said that there was no material
contribution because there was no ongoing relationship with the software
users.76 Judge Wilson ruled that because the defendants did not have the
ability to supervise and control their users' infringing conduct, Grokster and
forms initially were powered by the same FastTrack networking technology .... As a result,
users of these software platforms ... were able to exchange files seamlessly." Id.
68. Id. at 1032 n.2.
69. Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005) (determining that people who located
Grokster when searching for free file-sharing software "would have understood Grokster to
be offering the same file-sharing ability as Napster").
70. Grokster1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
71. Id. at 1033, 1046; see also infra Part III.B.3.
72. Maxwell, supra note 65, at 349-50.
73. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1037-38; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 349.
74. Maxwell, supra note 65, at 350.
75. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36 (including "distributing movie trailers, free
songs or other non-copyrighted works; using the software in countries where it is legal; or
sharing the works of Shakespeare"). Grokster and StreamCast both introduced evidence of
legitimate uses of their systems, such as "numerous declarations by persons who permit their
work to be distributed via the software, or who use the software to distribute public domain
works," including Project Gutenberg's digital library of public domain literature. Grokster II,
380 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2004); Maxwell, supra note 65, at 350. As Justice Breyer
would later point out during oral arguments, for more than twenty years, the industry had
relied upon Sony's safe-harbor to allow the development of both innovation and thriving
creative industries. Grokster III Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 35.
76. GroksterI, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 350.
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StreamCast were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the vicarious
infringement liability claim." The partial summary judgment related only to
whether the then-current versions of the defendants' products subjected
them to vicarious or contributory infringement liability, not whether the
defendants were liable for past actions or versions of their products and ser-
vices.78
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
On August 19, 2004, on interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of
Grokster and StreamCast, relying on Sony's safe-harbor doctrine. 79 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used a different basis for finding
against the plaintiffs on the contributory infringement claim than did the
district court."0 The Ninth Circuit's opinion made a passing mention of the
elements of knowledge and material contribution, but it concentrated the
formulation of its Sony test on the level of knowledge required instead of the
timing of that knowledge.8' Writing for the court, 2 Circuit Judge Sidney R.
Thomas interpreted Sony's safe-harbor doctrine to mean that the distributor
of a product capable of substantial, noninfringing uses cannot be held liable
for contributory infringement unless the distributor (1) has actual knowl-
edge of specific instances of infringing activity by its users and (2) fails to
take action to prevent those infringing activities.8 3 Under the Ninth Circuit's
test, a showing of constructive knowledge would be sufficient if the product
was not capable of substantial or commercially significant, noninfringing
uses." Conversely, a showing of actual, specific knowledge and a failure to
act on that knowledge to prevent further infringement would be needed to
create liability if the product was capable of substantial or commercially
significant, noninfringing uses. 5 Because Grokster and StreamCast's soft-
ware utilized a "decentralized architecture," the court concluded that the two
companies had no actual knowledge of their users' infringment.86 Addition-
77. Groksterl, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-46.
78. Id. at 1033.
79. GroksterlI, 380 F.3d at 1167.
80. Id. at 1154; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 350.
81. GroksterfI, 380 F.3d at 1161; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 350.
82. The three members of the court included Circuit Judges Sidney R. Thomas, Robert
Boochever, and John T. Noonan, Jr. Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1157.
83. Id. at 1162 (concluding that the Grokster and Streamcast software had commercially
viable noninfringing uses).
84. Id. at 1161; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 351.
85. Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1161; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 351.
86. Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1161; see also Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (2005).
There was evidence below to indicate that "Grokster and StreamCast previously operated
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ally, the court concluded that while the defendants may have had actual
knowledge of specific uses as a result of notices from the RIAA, the knowl-
edge came too late for the companies to have a duty or an ability to act on
that knowledge.87 Citing the district court opinion, the court then concluded
that the product was "capable of substantial [or commercially significant]
noninfringing uses," such as distributing public domain literature and music
that bands had authorized for distribution on the networks.88 Thus, under its
interpretation of Sony, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
partial summary judgment and remanded for a decision on issues remaining
after the partial summary judgment.89
The media companies petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, ostensibly to resolve the split between the Seventh and
Ninth circuits on the interpretation of Sony's safe-harbor doctrine.9" When
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it took what some said was to be "its
biggest copyright case" in more than twenty years since Sony.9,
III. BACKGROUND
The following section provides the background of vicarious and con-
tributory copyright infringement liability doctrines, focusing on the underly-
ing policy rationale behind copyright protection itself. This section will then
trace the development of third-party liability by identifying the standards for
vicarious liability for copyright infringement,92 discussing the standards for
contributory liability for copyright infringement,93 and describing the devel-
opment of a safe-harbor defense to contributory liability for copyright in-
supernodes," which would have given them the ability to have some actual knowledge of the
specific infringing activities. Grokster 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2771 n.4. Nonetheless, as the Court
noted, this evidence "would not [have] affect[ed its] conclusions in any event." Id.
87. Grokster l, 380 F.3d at 1162; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 351.
88. Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162; see also Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2767; Maxwell,
supra note 65, at 351. Unlike Grokster 1H, Aimster's system contained no evidence of the
product being used for such legal purposes. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2003); see also infra Part III.B.6 (discussing in depth the Aimster litigation).
89. Groksterll, 380 F.3d at 1167.
90. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 13, 24 (stating that the decision of
the Ninth Circuit "creates a direct and acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit's
Aimster decision .... The undoubted legal and practical importance of the question presented
in this case, and the conflict between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits, provide ample grounds
for this Court to grant review."); see also Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co.,
158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
91. Richard A. Epstein, Untying the Grokster Knot: Learning to Live in a Second-Best
World, 12 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 177, 178 (2005).
92. See infra Part III.B.2.
93. See infra Part III.B.2.
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fringement in Sony.94 Finally, this section will analyze the ambiguity of the
Sony safe-harbor doctrine by reviewing two recent cases, prior to Grokster
II, that challenged the limits of the doctrine's application.9"
A. The Policy Rationale Behind Copyright Protection
While copyright protection for creative works is a relatively recent
96
and artificial construct,97 the time-limited monopoly protections it created
were so valuable that provisions for them were included in the United States
Constitution.9" During the United States Constitution's creation and adop-
tion, the drafters approved the Patent and Copyright Clause unanimously
and without debate.99 Some historians claim that the debate is missing from
the official records because, while heated, it took place in private.00 The
only official statement in support of including the Copyright Clause' in the
94. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also
infra Part III.B.3.
95. Grokster 11, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d
643 (7th Cir. 2003); Napster I, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra Part III.B.
96. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JuKEBOx 29-30 (2003). Prior to copyright, people asserted moral claims to a work. Id. at 30.
For instance, when a sixth-century monk made a copy of an Abbot's psalter without permis-
sion, the King ordered the copy to be turned over to the Abbot with the following proclama-
tion: "To every cow her calf, and to every book its copy." Id. at 30-31. Until the advent of
the printing press, these types of claims were seldom asserted. Id. at 31.
97. Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors 'Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 1,
2-3 (1995). The first modem copyright was created in Britain in 1534 by royal decree. Id.
The decree required anyone who wished to publish to have a license and "approval by official
censors." Id. The common law development of copyright took place alongside the develop-
ment of the printed word. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429-30; Leaffer, supra, at 2. The printing press is
the seminal example of how the law changes in response to technological progress: it was the
invention of the printing press that gave rise to the original development of, and "need for,"
copyright protection. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
98. UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 8.
99. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 1-2 (2002) (determining from the historical
record that "[tihe Clause received only the briefest mention[,] and there was no opposition to
it").
100. See Opening Statement of Dr. Richard L. Thurston, FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competi-
tion and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in a Knowledge-Based Economy (Mar. 20,
2002) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020320richardthurstonstatement.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2006). Dr. Thurston found that, regarding patents, Jefferson's and Madison's
personal papers were "replete with discussion[s]" on the subject of creating a "monopoly
grant to inventors." Id. at 2.
101. Walterscheid, supra note 99, at 2 (stating that "[w]ith the exception of James Madi-
son in The Federalist No. 43, no Framer ever offered any explanation of the Clause or of why
it was included in the draft Constitution").
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United States Constitution comes in the form of a single paragraph by James
Madison in The Federalist No. 43. °02
As a general practice, copyright law creates a property right in any type
of creative or intangible work created by an "author."' 10 3 It was not until the
eighteenth century that copyright holders had exclusive rights to make cop-
ies of their protected works."° At that time, the printing press was the largest
concern to those creating copyright laws.15 In fact, the very first copyright
legislation-the Statute of Anne, passed in 171 0-was an attempt to control
the power of the printing press." 6 Though derived from previous stop-gap
attempts by the crown at controlling the printing press, the Statute of Anne
is considered to be both the advent of modem copyrights 10 7 and "the model
for copyright law in the United States."'0 8 Beginning with Connecticut in
1783, and prior to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, twelve of the thirteen
original states enacted copyright acts modeled after the Statute of Anne.' 9
The Statute of Anne provided protection for a book or other writing for a
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 1973). James Madi-
son's complete supporting statement for the clause reads as follows:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy-right of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right of the common law.
The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inven-
tors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
The states cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and
most of them have anticipated the decision on this point, by laws passed at the
instance of congress.
Id.
103. Leaffer, supra note 97, at 2-3.
104. Id. The first known copyrights appeared in Renaissance Italy, whose government
issued priviligii (privileges) on an ad hoc basis, granting a monopoly license for a specified
period to print or sell an entire class of books, usually classics, the authors of which were
long since dead. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 43-
44 (1967). Under Venetian patent law, the government granted Marc' Antonio Sabellico a
privilegii on September 1, 1486, for his history, Decades rerum Cenetarum, in what may
have been the first-ever copyright given to an author for his work. Id.
105. Leaffer, supra note 97, at 2-3; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791:
An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in
Article , Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, 52 EMoRY L.J. 909, 913
(2003). The Copyright Clause, coupled with the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment,
outlines the bounds of "Congress's power over the printing press." Patterson & Joyce, supra,
at 910.
106. Leaffer, supra note 97, at 2-3.
107. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 105, at 916.
108. Leaffer, supra note 97, at 2-3.
109. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 41. Noah Webster-seeking to protect the profits from
the sale of his book, Grammatical Institute of the English Language-along with Thomas
Paine and Joel Barlow, were the main lobbyists for comprehensive copyright acts for the
States. Id. at 40-41.
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limited time of fourteen years,"0 during which the copyright owner's con-
sent was required before a book could be copied."' After the protection pe-
riod, the work fell into the public domain, a legal concept that is said to be
one of the more important aspects of the development of copyrights." 2 This
tradeoff attempted to protect both the artist and society by balancing the
original creator's right to profit from her work and "the public's right of
access"--the first time the latter right was recognized." 3 This delicate bal-
ancing act remains, essentially, the goal of American copyright law." 4
United States copyright law protects "original work[s] of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.""' 5 There are three types of
liability for copyright infringement: direct, contributory, and vicarious in-
110. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 105, at 920. Coincidentally, this was the original term
of copyright in the original Copyright Act, enacted by the First Congress on May 31, 1790.
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REPORTS ON THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND CONCURRENT
AMENDMENTS 1-5 n.3 (2000). It remained so until 1831, when Congress increased the term of
protection to twenty-eight years. Id. The term has periodically and continually increased since
that time. See United States Copyright Office, A Brief Introduction and History, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circla.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). For most copyrights,
the current term is for the life of the author plus seventy years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006), a
length that even the current United States Register of Copyrights believes is too long. UNC
Symposium for Intellectual Property, Creativity, and the Innovation Process, UNC Law
School, November 2, 2005 (Statement of Mary Beth Peters, the United States Register of
Copyrights) ("We've certainly lengthened the term perhaps-I won't even say perhaps-too
long a term. I think it is too long. I think that was probably a big mistake, but one that Con-
gress can make."). Professor Lawrence Lessig argued in Eldred v. Ashcroft that "enlarging
the term for published works with existing copyrights" overstepped Congress's authority, an
argument with which the Court did not agree. 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003). Justice Stevens's
dissent agreed with Lessig's argument that retroactive extensions served only to perpetuate a
monopoly in contravention of the Constitutional purpose of the copyright clause. Id. at 227
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ex post facto extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer
of wealth from the public to authors, publishers, and their successors in interest.").
111. Leaffer, supra note 97, at 3.
112. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 105, at 918 ("The policy of the public domain was the
most subtle, and arguably the most important, of the policies. It prevented copyright from
being used to capture existing works, and it freed works from the copyright monopoly after a
limited time.").
113. Id.at919,923.
114. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 74-75 (2004). Lessig's alternate,
and more modem, formulation is that every copyright law must balance the dual goals of
allowing "innovators" to develop new content delivery methodologies while also protecting
the financial interests of the copyright holders. Id.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 12.02 Copyright, 12-1 (Supp. 2003).
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fringement liability. The latter two are due to the infringing actions of a
third party.11 6
B. Historical Development of Third-Party Liability for Copyright In-
fringement
1. Vicarious Copyright Infringement Liability
One rationale for holding a party liable for another's infringing acts
springs from the doctrine of respondeat superior. 7 Interestingly, some of
the earliest cases involving the infringement of music copyrights dealt with
new challenges to intellectual property protection due to an emerging tech-
nology: the player piano.'
M Witmark & Sons v. Calloway (M. Witmark & Sons I/), "' a case in-
volving the player piano, demonstrates the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior to cases of vicarious liability for copyright infringe-
ment. In M Witmark & Sons, the defendants operated a silent-movie theater
that made use of a player piano to provide musical accompaniment to their
movie performances. 2 0 Unbeknownst to the owners, one of their employees
had exchanged a music roll for the player piano with another local busi-
ness."' This roll was then played during at least one performance. 22 Al-
though the employee had "borrowed this music without the direction,
knowledge, or consent of the owner or manager of the theater," the court
concluded that the theater owners were vicariously liable for their em-
ployee's infringing actions."' Additionally, the court affirmed the then-
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 115, at § 12.02[C] Copy-
right Infringement, 12-10. Direct infringement, which falls under a strict liability standard, is
beyond the scope of this writing. See WINr & WRIGHT, supra note 115, at § 12.02.
117. Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 815, 859 (2005) (explaining that vicarious copyright liability is generally de-
scribed by courts "as an outgrowth of respondeat superior"). Respondeat superior is defined
as "holding [a] . . . principle liable for the . . . agent's wrongful acts." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004).
118. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8 (1908); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 110, at 4-2. In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit com-
mented on this very fact in Grokster II, stating that "[firom the advent of the player piano,
every new means of reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright
owners, often resulting in federal litigation." 380 F.3d at 1158.
119. 22 F.2d412,414(D. Tenn. 1927).
120. Id. at 413.
121. Id. The song in question was Smilin' Through by Arthur A. Penn. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id, at 414 (citing M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470
(D.S.C. 1924), a previous player piano case involving the same plaintiff). In other cases,
employers were found liable under the common law principle that the "master is civilly liable
in damages for the wrongful act of his servant in the transaction of the business," despite the
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established common law rule that intent to infringe is not a requirement to
be held liable for infringement. 24 While it may not have been the intent of
the theater operators to violate copyright, the court held that this fact would
not absolve them of liability. 2 The decision in M Witmark & Sons, like
many others, relied on the rule that "[t]he result, and not the intention, de-
termines the question of infringement."' 26
As seen in cases such as Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. ,127 vi-
carious liability is no longer limited to the classical confines of respondeat
superior. 12 Vicarious liability attaches after direct infringement takes place
when a defendant (1) had "the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity," and (2) had an obvious and direct financial interest in such activi-
ties. 29 Intent to infringe or knowledge of the infringement is not required.3 '
In Fonovisa, the defendant, Cherry Auction, operated a flea market in which
third-party vendors sold counterfeit copies of music in contravention of the
plaintiff's copyrights and trademarks.' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Fonovisa's
complaint, saying that Cherry Auction would likely be held liable under the
doctrine of vicarious liability both for having a right to supervise its ven-
dors--due to Cherry Auction's broad contractual right to police its ven-
dors-and for profiting from its vendor's infringement. 3 2 While Cherry
Auction did not derive a commission from its vendor's receipts, "the sale of
fact that the employees were acting in derogation of the employer's orders. Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Veltin (Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 1), 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (D. La. 1942); ac-
cord M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (M Witmark & Sons 1), 298 F. 470
(D.S.C. 1924); McDonald v. Hearst, D.C., 95 F. 656, 657 (D. Cal. 1899).
124. M Witmark & Sons 11, 22 F.2d at 414 (citing Journal Publ'g Co. v. Drake, 199 F.
572 (9th Cir. 1912); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C. Mass. 1869)).
125. Id. The decision indicates that the theater operators had a copyright infringement
issue several years prior and had taken active steps to avoid infringement. Id. at 413.
126. Id. at 414 (citing Journal Publ'g Co., 199 F. 572; Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519
(C.CN.Y. 1886); Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325 (C.C. Pa. 1884); Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. 26).
127. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
128. Id. at 262. The existence of a master-servant or employer-employee relationship, a
requirement for liability under respondeat superior, is no longer a requirement for vicarious
liability. Napster 11, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (citing
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co. (Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. If), 316 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1963); Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745 (D. Md.
2003).
129. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971)); see also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. II, 316 F.2d 304; Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v.
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding owner of dance hall
liable for copyright infringement by a band hired to entertain dance hall customers).
130. See CoStar Group, 373 F.3d at 550; Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162.
131. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259.
132. Id. at 261,263.
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pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction swap meet [was] a 'draw' for cus-
tomers," from which the defendant derived additional admission and park-
ing fees, as well as concession sales.'33
Thus, while the right and ability to supervise is most easily expressed
in the employer-employee relationship, it extends to other supervisory rela-
tionships when the supervisory and financial interest elements are met.'34
While the stated policy of vicarious liability is to prevent an infringing party
from hiding behind "dummy" entities, 135 the general standard of oversight
required to create liability in these cases is "whether or not the proprietor
has knowledge of the compositions to be played or any control over their
selection.'
136
The only notable application of vicarious liability to the violation of
copyrights on the Internet is A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster
I).137 The Napster II court concluded that the online, peer-to-peer software
vendor, Napster, was liable for its users' infringement because it met' the
classical elements for vicarious infringement liability: (1) Napster, Inc.'s
users directly infringed the copyrights, (2) the company had the right and
ability to supervise its users' conduct and failed to do so, and (3) the com-
pany's "future revenue [was] directly dependent upon increases in user-
133. Id. at 263.
134. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. II, 316 F.2d at 307. Additional examples include landlords
who have been held liable for the activities of their tenants when rent was based on a percent-
age of the tenant's receipts, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Am. Invesco Mgmt., Inc., 217
U.S.P.Q. 1072, 1079 (D. Ill. 1981); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. II, 316 F.2d at 307; WlNN &
WRIGHT, supra note 115, at § 12.02[C] Copyright Infringement, 12-11; majority shareholders
who have been held liable for the companies in which they invest and have close control,
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478, 482 (D. Ohio 1984); and businesses
that have been held liable for the activities of independent contractors, Dreamland Ball
Room, 36 F.2d at 355. In Dreamland Ball Room, as in a number of similar cases commonly
referred to as the "'dance hall cases,' the owners of nightclubs and similar establishments
were held vicariously liable for the infringement of musical copyrights by bands performing
at the club." Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (D.
Mass. 1994); see also, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons II, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (D. Tenn. 1927) (con-
taining a list of "dance hall cases").
135. Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Momingside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002);
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. II, 316 F.2d at 309, and saying the important public
policy behind vicarious liability is to "prevent an entity that profits from infringement from
hiding behind undercapitalized 'dummy' operations when the copyright owner eventually
sues").
136. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 11, 316 F.2d at
307).
137. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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base."' 38 Indeed, Napster derived no significant revenue from its business
model. 39 The promise of future revenue was an adequate benefit on which
to impose vicarious liability.4 °
2. Contributory Copyright Infringement Liability
Contributory infringement liability originates from the principle of en-
terprise liability in tort law. 4' The accepted standard for contributory in-
fringement was set forth in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc.14 2 The Gershwin court held that liability will arise for
contributory infringement if the defendant (1) has knowledge of the infring-
ing conduct and (2) "induces, causes, or materially contributes to the in-
fringing conduct."' 143 Contributory infringement follows two general forms:
"(a) personal conduct that forms part of or furthers the infringement; or (b)
the contribution of machinery or goods that provide the means to in-
fringe.'
Recently, in addition to the requirement that the defendant have real or
constructive knowledge of the infringing activity, contributory liability also
requires either the failure to end the infringing activity or the encouragement
of it.' 45 Recent cases involving contributory infringement range from the
imposing of liability on operators of electronic bulletin board systems
(BBS)'46 who encouraged their users to upload infringing material 47 to hold-
138. Id. at 1023-24 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64
(9th Cir. 1996), for the principle that the element of financial benefit can be proven with
infringement that "enhance[s] the attractiveness of a venue").
139. William Sloan Coats, Mark R. Weinstein & Erik R. Zimmerman, Pre- and Post-
Grokster Copyright Infringement Liability for Secondary and Tertiary Parties, 842 PLI/PAT
221, 234 (2005) ("The court reasoned that even though Napster had not yet taken in any
revenues, future revenues would be dependent on the number of Napster users and thereby on
the amount of infringement.").
140. Id.
141. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1320. Under the principle of enterprise liability, an enter-
prise should bear the burden of risk as a cost of doing business when it creates that risk. Al-
fred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, En-
terprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1856 (2000). Such cost inter-
nalization "encourages risk creators to take precautions against loss [and] provides compen-
sation for victims." Id.
142. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artist Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
143. Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162; see also CoStar Group, 373 F.3d at 550; Coats,
Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 139, at 227.
144. Eric J. Schwartz, Outline of Domestic Copyright Law, 527 PLIIPAT 293,314 (1998).
145. Id.
146. "A bulletin board system or BBS is a computer system running software that allows
users to dial into the system over a phone line and, using a terminal program, perform func-
tions[,] such as downloading software and data, uploading data, playing games, reading news,
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ing a company liable for knowingly encouraging another infringing use of a
license. '48
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 49 the operators
of a BBS allowed their users to upload image files of Playboy's adult photo-
graphs for other users to download. ° The operators were held liable for
their users' copyright infringement because the operators encouraged up-
loading the files and had constructive knowledge that the activity was likely
to be occurring, even if they were not deriving an actual benefit. 5 ' As
pointed out in Napster II, a system operator is liable for the infringing mate-
rial put there by others only when he or she learns about specific infringing
material on his system.'52 Without actual or constructive knowledge of the
specific infringing activities, the system operator "cannot be liable for con-
tributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for
the exchange of copyrighted material."' 53
3. The Sony Betamax Safe-Harbor Doctrine
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 154 members
of the motion picture and entertainment industries sought to hold Sony, as
the producer and distributor of the Betamax videocassette recorder, liable
for the copyright infringement by that product's users.' 5' The issue in Sony
was, once again, new technology challenging the protection of established
copyrights.'56 In 1976, videocassette recorders were just starting to be sold
into homes. 5 Universal City Studios, along with Walt Disney Productions,
had lost the political fight to have the copyright laws amended in their favor,
and exchanging messages with other users." Bulletin Board System, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulletinboard system (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
147. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc. (Playboy 1), 982 F. Supp. 503, 505
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that defendants providing "facilities, direction, knowledge and encouragement,
amount[ed] to contributory copyright infringement"); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
148. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd. (Universal City Studios I), 615 F.
Supp. 838, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
149. 982 F. Supp. 503.
150. Id. at 505, 514.
151. Id. at 514.
152. Napster I, 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
153. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442-43
(1984)).
154. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
155. Id. at420.
156. Id. at 417; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 117-29; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
110, at 4-2.
157. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
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and the suit against Sony was seen as a test case to establish precedent
against this new, encroaching technology.
1 58
The decision to pursue Sony for contributory infringement on the basis
of its manufacturing, marketing, and sale of the Betamax videocassette re-
corder to consumers was novel at the time. 59 The theory of liability was
dependant on extending Justice Holmes's reasoning in Kalem Co. v. Harper
Bros. ,160 known as the Ben-Hur case, which was decided nearly seventy
years prior to Sony.'16 In Kalem, the Court held the defendant-a producer
of a film depicting chariot races from the book Ben-Hur without authoriza-
tion-secondarily liable for selling copies of the film to independent dis-
tributors, who then infringed the author's copyright by displaying the
films. 162 In Sony, the Respondents asked the Court to extend the Kalem deci-
sion to apply secondary liability when, although there was no identified
primary infringement, there was an assumption of likely widespread in-
fringement based on the products or activities of the defendant. 63 The stu-
dios argued that "Kalem stands for the proposition that supplying the
'means' to accomplish an infringing activity and encouraging that activity
through advertisement are sufficient to establish liability for copyright in-
fringement."'" 6 Justice Stevens's majority decision in Sony dismissed this
reading of Kalem as a "gross generalization" and refused to adopt the stan-
dard proposed by the studios. 6 5 Instead, Sony won the case outright when
the Court concluded that the Betamax manufacturer was not liable for its
customers' infringing uses of the product. 66 Nevertheless, the Court set
forth a new standard in which secondary liability could be based on an as-
sumption of extensive, primary infringement.
67
158. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 117. While Sony won this case, the Betamax videocas-
sette recorder would eventually lose the battle in the marketplace against JVC's rival VHS
videocassette format. The Betamax vs. VHS Format War, available at
http://www.mediacollege.com/video/format/compare/betamax-vhs.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2006). "The war was over by the late 1980s[,] ... production in America ended in 1993, and
the last Betamax machine in the world was produced in Japan in 2002." Id.
159. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 117.
160. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
161. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 117.
162. See generally Kalem, 222 U.S. 55.
163. Max Stul Oppenheimer, Yours for Keeps: MGM v. Grokster, 23 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 209, 227 (2005).
164. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 436 (1984).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 499; Karen M. Kramer, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster-The
Supreme Court's Balancing Act Between the Risks of Third-Party Liability for Copyright
Infringement and Rewards of Innovation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
169, 173 (2005).
167. Oppenheimer, supra note 163, at 227.
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Prior to Sony, secondary infringement liability was imposed by first
identifying primary infringement and then determining whether the defen-
dant had knowledge of the infringement and caused or contributed to the
infringement.168 Applying the "staple item of commerce" doctrine from pat-
ent law-that there can be no contributory patent infringement when the
defendant's products are a "staple item of commerce"-the Court held that,
as applied to copyrights, there could be no contributory infringement so long
as the product was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses" or "commer-
cially significant noninfringing uses.', 169 This left open the possibility that
there could be secondary liability based on a showing of "widespread, but
not completely identified, infringement," despite the lack of any statutory
provision imposing liability. 7 °
Sony's "staple item of commerce" analysis, known generally as the
Sony safe-harbor doctrine, is a defense to contributory infringement. 7 '
There has been much debate over the Sony safe-harbor doctrine because the
Court did not subsequently define the language used in the decision.'72 The
safe-harbor defense tends to protect manufacturers against contributory li-
ability when the "technology at issue could be used for both legitimate and
infringing purposes."' 73 The district and circuit courts' applications of
Sony's safe-harbor doctrine have been inconsistent because of the ambigui-
ties in the language of the decision.'74 These inconsistent applications have
caused a split in the circuits over the correct interpretation of the phrases
"substantial noninfringing uses" and "commercially significant noninfring-
168. See Sony, 464 U.S. at438 n.18.
169. Id. at 442; Coats, Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 139, at 229.
170. Oppenheimer, supra note 163, at 228. In Sony, the Supreme Court stated the follow-
ing:
The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who
have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity .... [Clontributory in-
fringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circum-
stances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another.
464 U.S. at 435.
171. See Napster I, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
172. Kramer, supra note 166, at 170, 173-74.
173. Id. at 170.
174. Oppenheimer, supra note 163, at 228-29; Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. & In re Aimster Litigation: A Study of Secondary Copyright Liability in the
Peer-to-Peer Context, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 504-05 (2005) (suggesting that the con-
fusion over the Sony decision was due to the Court "articulat[ing] a broad legal rule" but
emphasizing very specific facts to support its opinion, including the fact that over seventy-
five percent of the customers use the product to time-shift program viewing, a noninfringing
fair use).
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ing uses."'7 5 The commercially significant, noninfringing use identified in
Sony was "time-shifting," or recording television shows in order to view
them at a later time.'76 The Sony court did not believe that time-shifting
would cause any harm to identifiable markets, such as movie theaters.'77
Additionally, whether authorized or unauthorized by the content owner, the
Court determined time-shifting to be a legitimate, fair use by the consum-
ers.
78
In analyzing the recordings that owners of the Betamax videocassette
recorder made of television shows as a potential fair use, the Court looked to
the factors laid out in the United States copyright code:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit[,] educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 179
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. s° may indicate a potential
limit of the Sony approach when applying the fair-use doctrine to new tech-
nology.' 8' A service offered by MP3.com allowed users to insert a CD into
their computer, and MP3.com software would identify the CD, giving the
users access to an online service that would allow them to listen to the music
contained on the CD. 82 To facilitate this, MP3.com purchased 50,000 CDs
175. Oppenheimer, supra note 163, at 228-29. The different interpretations are manifest
in the application of the standard in three cases involving peer-to-peer file sharing: Napster I,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000), In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003), and Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2003). See Kramer, supra
note 166, at 170.
176. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,443 (1984).
177. Id. at 454-55; Stacey L. Dogan, Comment, Sony, Fair Use, and File Sharing, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 971, 975 n.14 (2005) ("In the age of TiVo, it seems quaint that the
Justices assumed that time-shifters would watch all commercials, but they appear to have
made exactly that assumption.").
178. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
180. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that downloading music files
from MP3.com's service was not a fair use, even when the end user owned a copy of the
music in another format).
181. Elisabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV.
10, 28 (2005) ("The court rejected this argument on the premise that the record companies
had the right to grant or withhold a license to perform such a service.").
182. UMGRecordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
[Vol. 29
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
and began the process of copying the content of those CDs to their serv-
ers.'83 The five major music labels sued MP3.com nine days after it launch-
ed the service. 4 While access to the online versions-what MP3.com ar-
gued to be "space shifting"--would be available only to those who already
owned the CD, the district court concluded that the company copying of the
CDs was not a fair use because "the use was commercial and non-
transformative; entire, creative works were copied; and the defendant was
usurping a developing market for sound recordings." '85 In its decision, the
district court capped its criticism of MP3.com's defense by saying "on any
view, defendant's 'fair use' defense is indefensible and must be denied as a
matter of law."'
' 86
4. Sony's Safe-Harbor Doctrine Tested Under Fire: Napster II and
Aimster
As seen in the varying results among the circuits when applying Sony
to peer-to-peer technology to determine contributory liability, the applica-
tion of the "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" test has been incon-
sistent.8 7 Seeking to stop the threat that peer-to-peer networks posed, asso-
ciations of copyright holders, such as the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), commenced a number of contributory infringement law-
suits against peer-to-peer software providers, beginning with Napster.' 88 The
183. LESSIG, supra note 114, at 190.
184. Id.
185. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (holding that the space-shifting argument
was an "insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of [fair use]"); June M. Besek, Music on
the Internet, 838 PLI/PAT 263, 265 (2005); LESSIG, supra note 114, at 190.
186. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352. After this case, one of the plaintiffs pur-
chased MP3.com and then sued the attorneys who had advised MP3.com that the service
would be legal under copyright law. LESSIG, supra note 114, at 190.
187. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); Moye,
supra note 20, at 659-60. The Sony Court refused to provide "precise content to the question
of how much use is.. . significant." Id. at 659.
188. Moye, supra note 20, at 661. The RJAA has also directly sued the end users of peer-
to-peer software, who are the primary infringers. John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General, United States Dept. of Justice, Speech Before the New York State Bar Associa-
tion and International Bar Association: Privacy and Intellectual Property-Legal Issues Re-
lated to Peer-to-Peer File Sharing over the Internet (Oct. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/Malcolmtestimony102303.htm ("P2P users who are illegally
sharing copyrighted materials on the Internet are perhaps not so anonymous as they might
imagine themselves to be, as over 250 P2P users who were recently sued by the Recording
Industry Association of America can attest."); see also Recording Industry Continues Cam-
paign Against Online Music Theft in Latest Round of Lawsuits, Jan. 31, 2006, available at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/013106.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2006); RIAA Brings
New Round of Lawsuits Against 751 Online Music Thieves, Dec. 15, 2005, available at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/121505.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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results of this and subsequent suits against peer-to-peer software vendors,
namely Aimster and Grokster, were inconsistent.' 89 The Seventh and Ninth
Circuits split on the issue, failing to clarify whether the Sony test imposed
liability on peer-to-peer vendors, especially when many peer-to-peer soft-
ware programs met the "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" require-
ment of Sony.'90 The next two sections examine these cases individually:
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster HI)"91 and then In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 92 with an emphasis on the circuit court's interpreta-
tion and application of Sony's safe-harbor doctrine in each. With one excep-
tion, the Ninth Circuit's later decision in Grokster II, all circuit court cases
have shifted the balance between the development of new technology and
the rights of content creators and owners to favor copyright holders. 93
5. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
In Napster II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the implications of Sony, stating that the safe-harbor doctrine did
not absolve the company of liability, and then, the court decided the case
based on a standard different than that articulated in Sony.' 94 Thus, the deci-
sion added no real clarity to the courts' applications of Sony. 95
Napster provided software and supporting services that allowed its us-
ers to exchange, among other things, music files in MP3 format. 19 6 At one
time, users on the Napster network were exchanging 10,000 files per sec-
ond. 97 In the A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. litigation, Napster lost at
the district court level and then again on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.' 98 Af-
firming the district court's findings, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that peer-to-peer software distributors, such as Nap-
ster, could be held liable for contributory infringement under the Sony stan-
dard but that the specific facts of the case implicated the common law test
for contributory copyright infringement. 9 9 The Ninth Circuit relied on
189. Moye, supra note 20, at 661-62.
190. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; Moye, supra note 20, at 662.
191. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
192. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
193. LESSIG, supra note 114, at 194 n.10.
194. Lee, supra note 174, at 493-95.
195. Id.
196. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D.
Cal. 2000); Coats, Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 139, at 232.
197. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902; Coats, Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 139,
at 232.
198. Napster1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896; Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
199. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1021-22; Lee, supra note 174, at 493.
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Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc. 211 to de-
fine the common law elements of contributory infringement liability: an
infringer is "'one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes[,] or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."' 20'
The Napster system utilized a number of centralized servers to provide
an index of files available on the network and a registration system to allow
users to join the network.02 This centralized index allowed Napster users to
search for music files located on other users' computers within the sys-
tem.2"3 The fact that Napster owned and maintained the centralized servers
was a deciding factor for the court.2' The court determined that having an
ongoing level of control over the search index facilitated the actions of the
system's users. 25 The court concluded that Napster had actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement from notices provided to the company by
RIAA. 20 6 In addition, internal e-mails by one of the company's co-founders
indicated that they were aware of their users' infringing activity.20 7
With the "knowledge of the infringing activity" element met, the court
then concluded that, as a service provider, the operation of the centralized
index and registration servers materially contributed to the infringement.2 '
Not only did the company know of its users' infringement, but, by operating
the servers, the company had the ability to "block access to the system by
suppliers of the infringing material, and ...failed to remove the mate-
rial., '2' The court's decision left no question as to the company's contribu-
tory infringement liability.20 Additionally, the court concluded that Napster
200. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
201. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162); see also
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
202. Lee, supra note 174, at 493.
203. Maxwell, supra note 65, at 345.
204. Lee, supra note 174, at 494.
205. Id.
206. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Maxwell, supra note 65,
at 345-46 ("RIAA informed the company of over 12,000 direct infringement acts.").
207. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918 ("[A] document authored by co-founder Sean
Parker mentions the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses 'since they
are exchanging pirated music."').
208. Lee, supra note 174, at 493-94. "[T]he Napster court's approach ... improperly
conflate[ed] the substantial noninfringing use defense with the knowledge element of the
contributory infringement cause of action." Jensen, supra note 32, at 28.
209. Napster 11, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). When the company later indicated
that it had developed software that would allow it to block 99.4% of illegal file sharing, dis-
trict court Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel rejected this, saying the only acceptable solution
would be to reduce infringement by users "down to zero." LESSIG, supra note 114, at 73-74;
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 167-68; Transcript of Proceedings at 34-35, In re Napster, Inc.
Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. MDL 00-1369 MHP, C 99-
5183 MHP).
210. SeeNapsterl1,239F.3dat 1022.
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was liable for vicarious infringement. 21' However, the decision made no
conclusions as to whether the software was capable of substantial, nonin-
fringing uses.212 As a result, the court never "resolve[d] the question of Nap-
ster's contributory liability as a product provider" under the Sony stan-
dard.2 13 While the decision quoted Sony's language to include "with con-
structive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material," the court then ex-
plained its understanding of the standard in somewhat different terms.2 4 In
the final analysis, while the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the Sony safe-
harbor doctrine, the court did state that its reading of the rule "was that the
distribution of a product that is capable of substantial noninfringing uses
does not constitute contributory copyright infringement, unless the distribu-
tor has actual knowledge of specific infringing activities and fails to exercise
its ability to stop those infringing acts." '215
6. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation
In In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, the Seventh Circuit gave quite a
different interpretation of Sony than did the Ninth Circuit.21 6 In order to as-
sess contributory copyright infringement liability under the Sony doctrine,
the Aimster court looked at five factors: (1) the ongoing relationship be-
tween the vendor and the users, (2) the balance between infringing and non-
infringing uses, (3) any willful blindness on the part of the vendor, (4) the
cost to the vendor to avoid the infringement, and (5) the probability of actual
217noninfringing uses.
The Aimster system was a peer-to-peer system that worked in conjunc-
tion with America Online's (AOL) Instant Messenger service, a peer-to-peer
chat network that allowed its users to share and trade files, mostly music in
MP3 format.21 ' The service's only users were AOL customers, and Aim-
ster's users were required to connect to an AOL chat room in order to trade
files.219 Aimster provided servers that collected and indexed information
211. Id. at 1020-21; Lee, supra note 174, at 493.
212. Lee, supra note 174, at 494.
213. Id. at495.
214. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)).
215. Coats, Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 139, at 235 (emphasis added); see
generally Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
216. See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004.
217. Lee, supra note 174, at 495-96.
218. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646; Maxwell, supra note 65, at 347.
219. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646; Lee, supra note 174, at 495 n.73.
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relating to the files available on the network, which provided search capa-
bilities to the users.22°
In affirming a lower court ruling granting a preliminary injunction
against Aimster, Judge Posner applied his interpretation of the Sony doc-
trine.22' The decision first considered the ongoing relationship between the
vendor and its users, and the court stated that, in the ongoing relationship,
the vendor may have some control over its users' actions.222 According to
the court, this "is a factor. .. in determining [the liability of the vendor as] a
contributory infringer., 223 Judge Posner's decision then considered the bal-
ance between infringing and noninfringing uses of the software and service,
saying that this balance was "downplayed in [Sony's] majority opinion," but
"it was apparent that the Betamax was being used for infringing as well as
noninfringing purposes. 224 Judge Posner suggested that, in balancing the
competing interests, legitimate users should not be denied the benefit of
technological advances just to punish the infringers. 25
Judge Posner then directly criticized the Ninth Circuit's "actual knowl-
edge of specific infringing uses" test articulated in Napster II.226 Judge Pos-
ner looked at the encryption built into Aimster's system, which shielded
Aimster from actual knowledge. 227 He understood this element to be nothing
but willful blindness on Aimster's part, and he concluded that, in copyright
law, "[w]illful blindness is knowledge., 228 Judge Posner then adopted a
knowledge rule that holds a distributor liable if it knew or should have
known of the infringing activity.229
Judge Posner briefly considered the final two factors: the cost to the
vendor of avoiding the infringement and the probability of actual, nonin-
fringing potential uses.230 To avoid infringement liability, the court set out a
test based on the cost to the vendor of stopping the infringing activities, first
articulated as a "highly burdensome" threshold 231' and later as a "dispropor-
220. Feder, supra note 46, at 884 ("AOL Instant Messenger takes care of some of the
housekeeping functions ... that the other peer-to-peer programs need to carry out on their
own. To this existing layer of peer-to-peer functionality, Aimster adds a searchable database
of files available on the network, and message encryption."); Maxwell, supra note 65, at 347.
221. Lee, supra note 174, at 495.
222. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649; Lee, supra note 174, at 495.
223. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648.
224. Id. at 649.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 646; Lee, supra note 174, at 496.
228. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650. While Sony said that "constructive knowledge" of infring-
ing uses will not create liability, Judge Posner distinguished willful blindness from mere
constructive knowledge. Maxwell, supra note 65, at 347-48.
229. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650; Lee, supra note 174, at 496.
230. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648.
231. Id.
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tionate cost. '232 The "highly burdensome" test is the rule the recording in-
dustry argued for in their briefs, and, as Judge Posner pointed out, the rule is
contrary to the Sony decision. 233 That is how AOL escaped liability, al-
though it too had the ability to stop the infringing use and did not do So.234
Aimster simply failed to prove its case to the court on this point. 35 Judge
Posner cited to Sony's "significant, noninfringing commercial use" test
when considering the potential for actual, noninfringing uses of the Aimster
system.236 Judge Posner said that the potential, noninfringing uses in Sony
were actual or highly probable and that, accordingly, Aimster would need to
show more than mere theoretical noninfringing uses. 237 Aimster failed to
prove actual, or even probable, future, noninfringing uses, and therefore,
Aimster failed this test as well.238 Judge Posner did not give guidelines as to
what would be required to meet this test, stating only that Aimster's evi-
dence was insignificant. 9
In the end, the court both embraced and extended Sony and concluded
that Aimster was liable for contributory infringement.240 The court inferred
factors from the Sony decision, such as the balancing test the court felt was
evident in Sony, and expanded others, such as the probability of non-
infringing uses rather than the capability of non-infringing uses.24'
IV. REASONING
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III),
the issue before the Court was whether Sony's safe-harbor rule provided
Respondents, Grokster and StreamCast, a defense to liability for contribu-
tory copyright infringement. 242 The United States Supreme Court held in
favor of the copyright holders, MGM Studios, concluding that Grokster and
StreamCast were liable by adopting an alternate theory of third-party, copy-
232. Id. at 653 ("[T]o avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least
reduce substantially the infringing uses.").
233. Id. at 649-50.
234. Id. at 648 ("[D]etection and prevention of the infringing uses would be highly bur-
densome.").
235. Id. at 651.
236. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
237. Id. ("We also do not buy Aimster's argument that .. all Aimster has to show in
order to escape liability for contributory infringement is that its file-sharing system could be
used in noninfringing ways, which obviously it could be."); Lee, supra note 174, at 496.
238. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652-53.
239. Id. at 653.
240. Maxwell, supra note 65, at 347-49.
241. Id; see also Lee, supra note 174, at 495-96.
242. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2783 (2005).
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right-infringement liability: active inducement.243 The Court's decision fo-
cused on Grokster and StreamCast's intent in promoting their product for
infringing uses.244 The Court's reasoning proceeded as follows: (1) Sony's
safe-harbor doctrine did not preclude liability on other theories;2 45 (2) the
Court adopted an inducement theory imposing third-party liability on those
who distribute a device while promoting its use to infringe copyrights; 246 and
(3) Respondents were liable under the inducement theory because they
sought to satisfy a known demand for an infringing product, took no steps to
stop or lessen the infringement, and derived added revenue from their prod-
uct's increased infringing use.247
This section discusses the manner in which the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed Grokster III and the Court's decision to adopt an inducement theory
for copyright liability.248 It then discusses the Court's decision to vacate the
lower court decisions granting partial summary judgment in favor of Grok-
ster and StreamCast based on the conclusion that, under the newly adopted
inducement theory, Respondents were likely liable for the infringing activi-
ties of their users. 249 Finally, the section will analyze the two concurring
opinions as an indication of how the Court might decide a case based on
Sony in the future.25°
A. The Court's Unanimous Opinion
1. The Court's Holding
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Grokster 111251 on June
27, 2005, the last day of the 2004-2005 term.2 2 In an opinion written by
Justice Souter, the Court unanimously vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment,
which upheld a grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents,
Grokster and StreamCast.253 In doing so, the Supreme Court adopted an in-
ducement liability rule that holds the distributor of a product contributorily
liable for users' infringing activities when the distributor promotes the use
of the product to infringe copyrights-as shown by clear expression or af-
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2771-74, 2780.
245. Id. at 2778.
246. Id. at 2780.
247. Id. at 2781-83.
248. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
249. Grokster Il, 125 S. Ct. at 2774; see also infra Part IV.A.3.
250. See infra Part IV.B.
251. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
252. United States Supreme Court Completes 2004-2005 Term, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2005/Jun/30-230940.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
253. Grokster Il, 125 S. Ct. at 2783.
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firmative steps to foster infringement-regardless of the product's lawful
uses.
254
While adopting the inducement liability rule in this case, the Court de-
clined to directly answer the central question before it: is the Sony safe-
harbor rule still valid, and if so, under what circumstances does it apply?
255
The Court, in support of the new rule, emphasized the need and importance
of maintaining "a sound balance between the respective values of supporting
creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in
new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for
copyright infringement., 256 The Court remitted the case for further findings
of fact and reconsideration under the inducement rule.257
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Sony in Affirming the District
Court's Grant of Summary Judgment
After a discussion of the facts and history of the case and a review of
the history and policy considerations underpinning the various theories of
secondary liability, including recent applications of the theories in cases
such as Aimster, the Court shifted to an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's appli-
cation of the Sony safe-harbor doctrine in Grokster 111.21' The Court ex-
plained that the Ninth Circuit interpreted Sony's basic proposition to mean
"that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer
can never be held contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of
it." '259 The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's analysis premised liabil-
ity on the distributors of a product having actual and "'specific knowledge
of infringement at a time at which they contributed to the infringement, and
failed to act upon that information.' ' 260 The Court noted that Grokster had
advertised to satisfy a known demand for a product to facilitate copyright
infringement, and it derived revenue from the increased infringing use of its
product.26' The Court also concluded that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly at-
tempted to distinguish the evidence that Grokster and StreamCast had pro-
moted infringing uses of their products from the facts in Sony in which the
defendants knew only that some uses would be infringing.262
254. Id. at 2780.
255. Id. at 2778 ("[W]e do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more
quantified description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liabil-
ity rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.").
256. Id. at 2775.
257. Id. at 2783.
258. Id. at 2774-77.
259. Grokster ll, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
260. Id. (quoting Grokster l, 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004)).
261. Id. at 2770-72.
262. Id. at 2781.
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The Court explained that the Ninth Circuit's analysis also premised li-
ability on a product's distributor having materially contributed to the in-
fringement. 263 It further explained why the Ninth Circuit's holding-that the
Respondents did not materially contribute to their users' infringement be-
cause the users searched for and traded files without the intervention or as-
sistance of Respondents-was incorrect and, therefore, was being over-
ruled.26 The Court observed that Grokster had taken no steps to lessen the
infringing activity, such as developing tools to filter out infringing activ-
ity.265 The Ninth Circuit had considered this fact "irrelevant" without the
attendant "independent duty to monitor their users' activity," but the Court
said that this evidence "underscore[d] Grokster's and StreamCast's inten-
tional facilitation of their users' infringement.
' 21
Therefore, in the Court's opinion, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Sony was overly broad and "convert[ed] the case from one about liability
resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory., 267 The Court
specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony to require "actual
knowledge of specific acts of infringement. '268 It also affirmed the interpre-
tation that, without evidence of intent to foster infringement, the mere distri-
bution of a product that is capable of substantial, noninfringing uses with
knowledge of third-party infringement "does not expose a distributor to con-
tributory liability. '269 However, the Court did not resolve the split in the
circuits by clarifying the application of Sony's safe-harbor doctrine 27 -
something most people expected the Court to do.27'
263. Id. at 2775.
264. Id.
265. Grokster I1I, 125 S. Ct. at 2781.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2778 ("We agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony, which
it read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case ap-
plied.").
268. Id. at 2775 (emphasis added); Lori Ploeger, Matthew D. Brown & Orion Armon, An
Overview ofMGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., COLO. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 89, 90.
269. Grokster I1, 125 S. Ct. at 2775; Ploeger, Brown & Armon, supra note 268, at 90
("Beyond that, there is disagreement regarding the limits and applications of the Sony deci-
sion, as evidenced by the two concurring opinions.").
270. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79 (saying that it was "enough to note that the Ninth
Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consid-
eration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required").
271. Craig Steckley, Note, MGM v. Grokster: A Disincentive for Technological Respon-
sibility, 7 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 299, 311 n. 124 (2005) (noting that one of the reasons
the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari was the split in the circuit courts).
2006]
UALR LAW REVIEW
3. Adoption of the Inducement Test for Contributory Infringement
Liability
Despite failing to resolve the split in the circuits over the application of
Sony's safe-harbor doctrine, the Court was able to reach a resolution of the
problem in Grokster through the adoption of a new rule.272 The Court
adopted an inducement test for contributory infringement liability, declaring
it "a sensible one for copyright[s]." 2" The Court declared that "one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copy-
right[s]. . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties." '274
The manner in which the opinion set this new rule suggested that the Court
formulated the question much more broadly than did either party to the
case.275 According to the opinion, the question before the Court was, "under
what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and
unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties us-
ing the product?" '276
Instead of applying the Sony safe-harbor doctrine, as did the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Court followed Justice Scalia's assertion during oral arguments that
the Court should not decide this case on the basis of stare decisis.277 As the
Sony Court had done two decades earlier,278 this Court looked to patent law
for guidance and found a suitable solution in the patent law theory of inten-
tional inducement of infringement liability.279 The Court explained that, un-
272. Grokster I, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Brief for Songwriter & Music Publisher Petitioners at i, Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005) (No. 04-480) (formulating the question as "[w]hether secondary copyright liability
extends to companies whose Internet-based 'file sharing' services facilitate copyright in-
fringement and exploit it through advertising"); Brief for Respondents, supra note 58, at i
(formulating the question as "[w]hether the court of appeals correctly ruled, on the only issue
before it, that respondents' distribution of the current versions of their file-sharing software
does not render respondents secondarily liable for every direct infringement of petitioners'
copyrights committed by users of the software"); see generally Brief for Motion Picture
Studio & Recording Co. Petitioners, Grokster I1, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).
276. Grokster 11I, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
277. Grokster III Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 41 (Justice Scalia stated to counsel for
Respondents that "[t]his Court is certainly not going to decide this case on the basis of stare
decisis. . . whatever else is true."). The doctrine of stare decisis is defined as "[t]o stand by
things decided." BLACK'S LAW DIcTToNARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004). Under stare decisis, "it is
necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation." Id.
278. Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2779; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984).
279. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 ("Sony took the staple article doctrine of patent law
as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule."). In patent law, the "staple item of commerce"
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der the theory of intentional inducement, a party is liable when it engages in
"purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" that promotes and encour-
ages the infringing uses of its product, not when it has "mere knowledge" of
infringement.80 Intent can be derived from "'active steps ... taken to en-
courage direct infringement,"' such as advertising.' The Sony Court de-
clined to adopt this same rule because Sony had not intentionally induced
infringement.8
Additionally, the Court noted that the actions of Sony's users were not
seen as infringing because they "qualified as legitimate fair use."2 3 The
Court distinguished Grokster from Sony on the issue of fair use, by saying
that the two were "significantly different. 2 11 While in both cases Respon-
dents could claim alternative uses, the Court reasoned that Grokster's
"unlawful objective [was] unmistakable," as evidenced by a "purpose to
cause and profit" from its users' direct infringement.285
4. Consideration of Summary Judgment: Respondents Liable Un-
der the Inducement Test for Contributory Infringement
After adopting the inducement test for contributory liability, the Court
then turned to consider Respondents' liability under the test.28 6 The newly
doctrine protects distributors from liability when they distribute a patented device that is
suitable for uses not claimed in the patent. Id. at 2777.
280. Id. at 2780.
281. Id. at 2779 (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992
(N.D. Ill. 1988)).
282. Id. at 2780; Sony, 464 U.S. at 454. Evidence in the record showed that the Betamax
video recorder was "advertised as being able to copy copyrighted works." Thomas A.
Mitchell, State of the Art(s): Protecting Publishers or Promoting Progress?, 12 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 7, 1 32 n. 149 (2005). While the Court may not have recognized any inducement on
Sony's part, the aforementioned advertising in the record and Sony's manual for the Be-
tamax, containing instructions on "Recording TV Programs" and "Recording One TV Pro-
gram While Viewing Another," provided evidence to the contrary. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n. 19
("Sony certainly does not 'intentionally induce' its customers to make infringing uses of
respondents' copyrights, nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known by it
to be engaging in continuing infringement of respondents' copyrights."); contra Sony Corp.,
Sony SL-7200 Betamax Videocassette Recorder Manual, 2, 4 (1975). Sony Betamax "ma-
chines are advertised for one purpose in life. Their only single mission, their primary mission
is to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people.... The ads are here. Here is
Sony that tells you that you can record one channel while watching another." Home Re-
cording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, HR. 4808, HR. 5250,
H.R. 5488 & H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (testimony of Jack
Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
283. Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2784 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-55).
284. Id. at 2782; Mitchell, supra note 283, 32.
285. Grokster ll, 125 S. Ct. at 2782.
286. Id. at 2780-81.
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adopted rule required two elements to make a vendor liable for direct acts of
infringement by third parties: the distribution of a device and the promotion
of the device to infringe copyrights.287 Here, the Court noted the "evidence
of [Respondents'] express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote fur-
ther" infringing uses. 288 For example, both companies sought to be Napster's
replacement, and executives for StreamCast monitored the number of copy-
righted songs on their network and sought to have more copyrighted songs
on their network than their competitors. 289 Grokster's customer newsletter
promoted the availability of copyrighted materials on their network, and
both companies' customer support teams assisted users "in locating and
playing copyrighted materials., 290 The Court reasoned that this and other
evidence fell into three categories that, together, justified an inference of
intent to induce users to participate in infringing activities. 29' First, Respon-
dents sought to satisfy a known demand for a product to facilitate infringe-
ment.292 Second, Respondents took no steps to lessen the infringing activity,
such as developing tools to filter out infringing activity. 93 Third, Respon-
dents derived added revenue from the increased use of their product due to
the infringing activity.294
The Court declined to weigh in on Grokster and StreamCast's vicarious
liability because it resolved that issue under the inducement theory for liabil-
ity.295 The Court explained that a product's distributor infringes vicariously
when it "profit[s] from direct infringement while declining to exercise a
right to stop or limit it."'296 The Court did, however, separately note the facts
that should have been sufficient for the lower courts to find Grokster and
StreamCast liable under a theory of vicarious infringement.2 97 These facts
included Respondents' failure to develop tools to halt or diminish the in-
fringing uses, which the Court took as clear evidence of "intentional facilita-
287. Id. at 2780.
288. Id. at 2774.
289. Id. at 2773, 2781. Once Petitioners notified StreamCast about the infringing files on
its network, StreamCast actively sought to block users it thought to be monitoring its net-
works. Id. at 2774.
290. Id. at 2780-81.
291. Grokster 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2781; Seth A. Miller, Note, Peer-to-Peer File Distribu-
tion: An Analysis of Design, Liability, Litigation, and Potential Solutions, 25 REv. LITIG. 181,
213-14 (2006).
292. Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2781.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2781-82.
295. Id. at 2776 n.9.
296. Id. at 2776 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. II, 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)).
297. Id. at 2781-82.
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tion" of the infringing activities and Respondents' intention to "profit from
third-party acts of copyright infringement.,
29
Finally, the Court briefly assessed the evidence of actual, direct in-
fringement by users of Respondents' software, a necessity under any third-
party liability theory.299 Noting ample evidence of actual infringement, the
Court concluded by applying the finding to a review of the motion for sum-
mary judgment.3" Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter for addi-
tional findings of fact and reconsideration of MGM's motion for summary
judgment.3"'
B. Two Concurring Opinions Concerning Sony's Safe-Harbor Doctrine
This section focuses on the two concurring opinions in Grokster.0 2 The
concurrences take opposing views on the correct interpretation of Sony's
safe-harbor doctrine and how the Court would have decided the case under
that theory. 3 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Kennedy, wrote the first concurrence, which would have reversed the
Ninth Circuit on the basis of Sony alone.3" Justices Stevens and O'Connor
joined Justice Breyer's concurrence, which would have affirmed in favor of
Grokster on Sony alone.30 5 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter did not write
or join a concurring opinion.306
1. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, which concluded that Grokster and
StreamCast did not meet the requirements for protection under Sony's safe-
harbor doctrine for two reasons.307 First, according to Ginsburg, the Sony
doctrine created a defense to liability if a product had substantial, nonin-
298. Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
299. Id. at 2782.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
303. Grokster 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2787, 2796.
304. Id. at 2783, 2786.
305. Id. at 2787, 2796.
306. Regarding Sony, Justice Breyer stated that "three of the Justices got it about right[,].
three leaned too far to protect copyright holders, and the remaining three didn't make up
their minds because they didn't have to." Stephen Breyer, Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Lecture to the Students and Staff of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William
H. Bowen School of Law (March 8, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Justice Breyer
Lecture]; see also Grfkster 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2783.
307. Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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fringing uses.3"8 Second, according to Justice Ginsburg, the doctrine allowed
an absolute defense to liability if there were commercially significant, non-
infringing uses for the product.3 9
Justice Ginsburg was underwhelmed by the scant evidence of nonin-
fringing uses in Grokster.31 ° The concurrence stressed that Respondents'
products were "overwhelmingly used to infringe" and that the infringing
uses provided the "overwhelming source of revenue from the products."31'
Justice Ginsburg thought it improbable that substantial or commercially
significant, noninfringing uses would develop in the future in light of the
history of Respondents' products.3"2 The concurrence also declared that,
based on the evidence presented, the question of there being any prospec-
tive, substantial or commercially significant, noninfringing uses of the prod-
ucts was "beyond genuine debate., 313 The concurring opinion concluded that
there "had been no finding of any fair use" as there had been in Sony, and all
evidence presented to the contrary was either pure anecdote or mere asser-
tion.314
In sum, the correct interpretation of Sony, according to Justice Gins-
burg's concurrence, is that Grokster and StreamCast could still be liable for
contributory inffingement.3 5 Even without the adoption of the inducement
rule, Respondents would be liable because there was no real evidence that
their products were capable of substantial or commercially significant, non-
infringing uses.
6
2. Justice Breyer 's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined,
agreed with the district and circuit courts in "favoring a more lenient inter-
pretation of substantial noninfringing use[s]." '317 Under Justice Breyer's in-
terpretation of Sony, no liability attaches "unless the product in question will
be used almost exclusively" for infringement.31 8 In Justice Breyer's judg-
ment, Grokster deserved protection from liability under the Sony safe-harbor
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2786.
311. Id,
312. Id.
313. Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2786.
314. Id. at 2785.
315. Id. at 2786.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring); David Moser, Free to Share? Grokster Decision
Sidesteps Innovation/Copyright Battle; Puts Focus on Business Strategies, TENN. B.J., Oct.
2005, at 14, 15 n.9.
318. Grokster II, 125 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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doctrine." 9 The concurrence centered on the evidence presented of nonin-
finging uses, specifically public domain works and files lawfully and per-
missibly shared on Grokster's network.32° Justice Breyer rebuffed Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence, concluding that Grokster and StreamCast met the
threshold for protection under Sony's safe-harbor-that a product be merely
capable of substantial non-infringing uses, even though the vendor distrib-
utes it with knowledge that it would be put to infringing use.32'
In his opinion, Justice Breyer considered both the substantial and capa-
bility elements from Sony.322 In analyzing the substantial element of Sony,
Breyer wrote that a reasonable inference from the evidence presented was
that roughly the same percentage of lawful use existed in Grokster as in
Sony-approximately ten percent.323 He continued by pointing out that this
small percentage of the total use was the same percentage sufficient in Sony
to meet the "substantial" threshold for protection from liability.324 Justice
Breyer continued by examining the capability element of Sony.325 In Sony,
the Court determined that ten percent legitimate use was sufficient to with-
stand liability because, as in the case of the Betamax videocassette recorder,
this evidenced the product's capacity for current, noninfringing use and po-
tential for increased future, noninfringing use.32 6 In Grokster, Breyer pointed
out that the evidence showed the P2P software was capable of actual nonin-
fringing use, and by extension, potential future use that would be nonin-
fringing.327
Justice Breyer also went to great lengths to affirm the policy balance
struck by Sony's safe-harbor doctrine. 328 He explained that the rule from
Sony was comprehensible, protected nascent technology, and was "forward
looking. 329 What the rule ultimately provided entrepreneurs, according to
Breyer, was a shield from liability as they develop new technologies. 330
Moreover, according to the concurrence, the bright line intended by Sony
made it intentionally demanding for the courts to impose liability unless
either the use of the product in question was exclusively for infringement or
319. Id. at2790-91.
320. Id. at 2790.
321. Id. at 2787 (recognizing that Sony knew that its customers would use the VCR for
infringement).
322. Id. at 2790-93.
323. Id. at 2788-89.
324. Grokster I, 125 S. Ct. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
325. Id. at 2791, 2793.
326. Id. at 2789.
327. Id. at 2789-90.
328. Id. at 2791-92.
329. Id.
330. Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the distributor encouraged or induced infringement."' The concurrence
noted that this difficulty in imposing liability protected a number of tech-
nologies in their infancy, particularly "VCRs, typewriters, tape recorders,
photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disc burners, digital
video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peer-to-peer
software.13
32
Justice Breyer argued that a modification of the rule, or a more strict
interpretation, as suggested by Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, would "in-
crease the legal uncertainty" for entrepreneurs and developers of new tech-
nology, drive up the risk of litigation, and "chill... technological develop-
ment., 333 Moreover, in Justice Breyer's view, a change would be ill advised
because it would weigh too heavily on the interests of the copyright holders
without concomitant incentives to create.334
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The following section discusses the ambiguity left by the majority
opinion and the conflict among the concurring opinions regarding Sony's
safe-harbor doctrine in terms of its impact on technological development
and the business ecosystems that support innovation.335 This Note argues, as
Justice Breyer predicted, that the Grokster III decision will have a direct
chilling effect in the high-tech world, both because of the Court's failure to
affirm the balance struck in Sony, thereby creating uncertainty regarding the
future of its safe-harbor doctrine, and because of the Court's adoption of the
inducement rule.336
For more than twenty years, the high-tech industry has relied on Sony
in making development and business decisions.337 According to The Econo-
mist, Sony had become "holy writ in Silicon Valley" because it supported
innovation that could be injurious to copyrights and allowed it to flourish.338
The National Venture Capital Association attempted to portray the decision
in the best possible light, saying that the decision was "favorable to the ven-
ture capital industry because the Supreme Court rejected the studios' strong
efforts to cut back on the protections for innovative technologies set forth in
331. Id. at2792.
332. Id. at 2791-92 (emphasis added).
333. Id. at 2792-93.
334. Id. at 2793-94.
335. See infra Part V.A-D.
336. See infra Part V.B.
337. See supra note 75.
338. Innovation and Intellectual Property: A Bad Week for Pirates, ECONOMIST, July 2,
2005, at 84.
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Sony. '339 It is easy, though, to see why this is not the case for at least four
reasons: (1) the split on Sony among the circuits, (2) the addition of a new
rule in the legal arsenal of copyright holders, (3) the need to seek legal opin-
ions in the more routine decisions of a company, and (4) the potential for the
personal liability of the investors themselves.
A. The Chill of Ambiguity
Now that Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist have been re-
placed by Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, the official opinion of five
members of the Court is not known, and "it is uncertain how the Court
might rule in a future case" based on Sony when substantially different facts
are involved.340 Additionally, the tech industry may not see Sony as sacro-
sanct as it previously had, especially when dealing with peer-to-peer tech-
nologies, now that the Court has disclosed its internal split in perspective
regarding Sony.14 ' A partner at a law firm that advises technology companies
said that "'P2P will continue to be a pariah in the investment community[,].
. and investors will be careful about touching anything that has digital con-
tent. "342
The National Venture Capital Association filed an amicus brief in
Grokster III in which it articulated the problems that the split among the
courts created for them.343 For instance, using the standard offered by Judge
Posner in Aimster creates a "'question[] of fact' that will require extensive
discovery."'3" According to the brief, this "encourages entrenched busi-
339. Mark Heesen, President, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, National Venture Capital
Association Reaction to United States Supreme Court Decision on MGM vs. Grokster (June
27, 2005), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/grokster%20statement%206-27-05.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2006).
340. Ploeger, Brown & Armon, supra note 268, at 90; William H. Hollander, Copyright
Protection Versus Technological Innovation: Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement
Becomes More Uncertain, FED. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 20, 21 (commenting on the fact that Sony
is now a "far murkier standard" than previously thought).
341. David Post, The Impact of Grokster, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005, at 10 (saying that
uncertainty remains as to how a claim based on Sony will play out in the future, specifically
as to "the precise meaning of 'capable of substantial[,] non-infringing use'"); David G. Post,
Annemarie Bridy & Timothy Sandefur, "Nice Questions" Unanswered: Grokster, Sony's
Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine, and the Deferred Verdict on Internet File Sharing,
2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 235 (2005) (concluding that the silence of the unanimous opinion
in Grokster "leaves considerable uncertainty" about the future application of Sony).
342. Heather Green, Keeping with the Grokster Theme, Bus. WK. ONLINE, June 29, 2005,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/techbeat/archives/2005/06/keeping_
with th.html (quoting Mark F. Radcliff, a partner at DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary).
343. See Brief of the National Venture Capital Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).
344. Id. at 19.
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nesses to file suit against prospective competitors and any other nascent
business whose product threatens their monopoly interests." ''
B. Living with the Inducement Rule
The day after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Grokster
III, the lead article in the business section of the New York Times announced
that the ruling created "serious concern" among peer-to-peer advocates and
that the innovation sector in America faced a "new era of.. . uncertainty. 346
The concern, according to the article, was that the Court's emphasis on in-
tent invites lawsuits and "could mire new technologies in a litigious
limbo., 34
7
The inducement rule will certainly "make IT and electronics firms
more cautious about how they market their products., 34' The rule will allow
an emboldened entertainment industry to claim, true or not, that any com-
pany that distributes a product that is used for infringement knew of the in-
fringement and had the intent to encourage it.349 Although these companies
may or may not be inducing infringement, the cost of discovery in potential
lawsuits could easily "kill off ... small innovative start-ups.""35 It has even
been said that the ruling will allow the entertainment industry "to sue with-
out restraint ... [against] every technology it does not like."35'
Speculation began almost immediately as to who would be the first
company sued by the entertainment industry under the new rule.3 2 As it
turns out, RIAA used the Grokster III decision as justification for sending
out cease-and-desist letters to seven P2P file-sharing firms in September
345. Id.
346. Tom Zeller, Jr., The Supreme Court: The File Sharers; Trying to Tame an Unruly
Technology, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at Cl (quoting Fred von Lohmann, an intellectual
property lawyer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
347. Id. ("Every e-mail message, every conversation, every cocktail napkin on which an
entrepreneur scribbles a vision for a new technology... could become evidence in a future
lawsuit, making unfettered blue-sky innovation a risky business without lawyers vetting
every move.").
348. Innovation and Intellectual Property: A Bad Week for Pirates, supra note 338, at 84.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Zeller, supra note 346, at Cl. This claim is more believable when viewed from the
perspective of Dr. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Assistant Professor, Department of Culture and
Communication, New York University, who characterized the struggle between online, music
file sharing and copyright holders as a "battle for control of the music and information pipe-
lines, not the music itself." SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 181 (2001).
352. Innovation and Intellectual Property: A Bad Week for Pirates, supra note 338, at 84.
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2005, including BearShare, LimeWire, and WinIX.353 These lawsuits dem-
onstrate that, in the future, developers of new technologies should seek
counsel before acting.354 But requiring prior legal review before acting does
not create an environment that is conducive for breeding innovation and
developing new technologies.
Some legal scholars have argued that the outcome of this case, in effect
the judicial adoption of a variation of proposed legislation,355 is favorable to
the legislative adoption because it allows the courts to have latitude in de-
termining when a distributor is encouraging or inducing copyright infringe-
ment.356 Arguing that the outcome of Grokster I1 was favorable, Professor
Pamela Samuelson 357 claims that the ruling leaves Sony's safe harbor intact
353. RIAA Goes After P2P Firms, RED HERRING, Sept. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a= 13616.
354. Ian C. Ballon, Reconsidering the Winners and Losers in MGM Studios v. Grokster,
L.A. LAw., Sept. 2005, at 60 ("Technology firms should involve copyright lawyers in the
development process to ensure that engineers are educated about a company's potential expo-
sure for inducement and the benefits of implementing engineering solutions to limit, rather
than encourage, infringement."); Green, supra note 342 ("[C]ompanies [will] need lawyers
involved more during the entire process of creating a company, from conceptual discussions,
to financial negotiations, to R&D, to customer outreach."); Lawrence Lessig, Newsmaker
Q&A: "Ten Years of Chilled Innovation, " Bus. WK. ONLINE, June 29, 2005, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2S5/tc205O629-2928-tc057.htm
("Now, when you innovate, you're going to have a legal review-what can you say, what
kind of things can you signal.").
355. The Grokster I inducement rule is surprisingly similar to the proposed regulatory
end run of the Sony doctrine by the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S.
2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004) ("Induce Act"). Introduced by Senators Hatch, Leahy, Frist,
Daschle, Graham, and Boxer, the Induce Act was a direct response to Grokster I in which the
district court stated that Grokster may have "intentionally structured their businesses to avoid
secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefiting financially from the illicit
draw of their wares." Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Maxwell,
supra note 65, at 363; see also Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing Before
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (Testimony of Mary-Beth Peters,
United States Register of Copyrights) ("The Grokster [1] decision fails to see the forest for
the trees; it essentially ignores defendants' intent to establish and create a network of massive
infringement ... upon which they have built their business."). Behind the scenes, several
drafts of the Induce Act circulated, and among them was one more favorable to the interests
of copyright holders than the Grokster I1 ruling. Telephone interview with David Jones,
Majority Staff, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 2006). All
drafts, including one more stringent than either the introduced act or the rule eventually
adopted by the Court, were rejected by copyright holders' lobbyists as not being tough
enough. Id.
356. Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Did MGM Really Win the Grokster Case?, 48
COMM. ACM 19, 24 (Oct. 2005) ("[A]ny law that would have come out of [Congress] would
have been a lot less technology-friendly than the Grokster decision the Supreme Court is-
sued.").
357. Professor of Law at University of California at Berkeley, Boalt School of Law, and
Co-Director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, University of California at
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as a reliable rule for technology developers.35 Other commentators have
said that fears of liability by companies that develop dual-use technology
that could be used to facilitate copyright infringement are overblown. "'
Taking the opposite view are scholars such as Professor Lawrence Les-
sig,360 who predicts that the fallout from the ruling will usher in "ten years of
chilled innovation. ' 3 6' Lessig contends that, while there will not be a rash of
litigation, the intent standard will simply cause "innovation that's channeled
in ways the copyright owners can agree to, or channeled in ways that avoid
any kind of possibility of this kind of litigation., 362 He indicates that, as of
June 2005, a shift in investment strategy had already taken place, with
money flowing where it avoids potential conflict with copyright holders.363
This is precisely the point that Samuelson and others miss-not that the
venture capital community will fail to invest, but that what they are willing
to invest in will become circumscribed.
C. Targeting Facilitators of Innovation
Venture capitalists are active investors specializing in startups, "a char-
acteristic that distinguishes them from just about every other class" of inves-
tors.36 Venture capitalists often serve as board members for the companies
they invest in, and they may sometimes serve as interim CEOs.365 In addi-
tion, venture capital funds typically have a ten-year maturity period,366
which tends to make their investments particularly sensitive to the receptiv-
ity of the legal environment and public markets.3 67 Any friction in these
Berkeley, available at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter Samuelson].
358. Id. at 24 ("I believe that as long as technology developers do not actively induce user
infringements, they can continue to innovate and rely on the Sony safe harbor.").
359. Joshua P. Binder, The Future of Streaming Technology After Grokster, 28-Dec. L.A.
LAW. 13, 17 (2005).
360. Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and Founder of the Center for Internet and
Society, Stanford University, available at http://www.lessig.org/bio/short/ (last visited Mar.
12, 2006).
361. LESSIG, supra note 114, at 354.
362. Id.
363. Id. ("Why buy a lawsuit when you can buy a new innovation that doesn't get you a
lawsuit? And[,] you don't even see it-you don't even know what you don't get because
people are afraid.").
364. JEFFREY ZYGMONT, THE VC WAY: INVESTMENT SECRETS FROM THE WIZARDS OF
VENTURE CAPITAL 35 (2001).
365. RANDY KOMISAR, THE MONK AND THE RIDDLE 39-41 (2000); ZYGMONT, supra note
364, at 34-38.
366. ZYGMONT, supra note 364, at 35.
367. Id. at 36 ("[V]enture capitalists depend upon a mechanism for converting their in-
vestments to tangible returns, within a reasonable time frame.").
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spheres, unless the return on risk is so great that it cannot be ignored, will
cause prudent venture capitalists to simply move on to safer areas of oppor-
tunity. 3
68
The role that venture capitalists play in startup companies may also sti-
fle investments in a different way, through the threat of "going after neces-
sary third parties[,] like investors and law firms. ' 36 9 An example of this
would be the complaint filed by UMG Recordings, Inc. seeking to hold
Hummer Winblad Venture Partners and two of its partners liable for con-
tributory and vicarious copyright infringement for their investment in Nap-
ster.37 ° While lawsuits against software and services providers stifle innova-
tion directly, lawsuits against necessary third parties threaten to dry up the
lifeblood of much innovation-speculative financial backing.37'
D. Copyright as a Tariff on Innovation
Extending the analogy that copyright is a tax on the reader, 37 2 copyright
has also become a tax on any entity that treads into the business area of a
copyright holder. The question for a developer is whether this tax has be-
come a tariff373-in other words, whether the copyrights are blocking legiti-
368. The value of P2P may be such that the reward overcomes risks that would make
other investments unattractive. One venture capitalist explained the investment value of P2P
this way:
[One] out of [ten] of the deals I am looking at has a P2P element. I look at what
the problem is to be solved, and sometimes P2P is a part of that solution-the se-
cret sauce that makes it work .... I look at P2P as one of the enabling technolo-
gies that make capital investments more efficient.
Telephone interview with Keith Benjamin, Managing Director of Levensohn Venture Part-
ners, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2006).
369. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1349-50 (2004) (emphasis added).
370. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
UMG Recordings, Inc. sought to hold both Hummer Winblad partners personally liable for
serving on Napster's board of directors and one for serving as the company's temporary
CEO. Id. at 1116. UJMG Recordings, Inc. is the same company that sued MP3.com's attor-
neys for advising the company that its planned music service was legal. See discussion supra
note 186.
371. See Ed Black & David McIntosh, Investors Face Potential Liability for Napster's
Copyright Infringement, Ropes & Gray Intellectual Property Client Alert, Aug. 2, 2004,
available at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/tbls20News/FileUploadl 16/447/AlertJuly%
2027,%202004_Napsterlntellectual%2OProperty.pdf.
372. See LORD THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 11 (A.
Thorndike ed. 1915) (Speech Delivered to British House of Commons Regarding 1841 Copy-
right Bill on Feb. 5, 1841).
373. "According to Macaulay, copyright is a tax on the reader for encouraging the author.
When does it act as a tariff? When does the tax act as a barrier?... [When you cannot use a]
work because your pocketbook is too small," or the author can no longer be found. Justice
Breyer Lecture, supra note 306.
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mate, technical innovation. Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide
Web, has pointed out that developers will restrict their work "in a given
direction when they hear rumors that some company may have a patent that
may involve the technology." '374 As Berners-Lee points out, the mere rumor
of difficulty is enough to get most developers to move in a different direc-
tion.37 Compared to a rumor, the actual lawsuits that the entertainment in-
dustry has brought have certainly steered many away from working with
peer-to-peer software, though the investment funding is still available to
those who make peer-to-peer a part of the solution to a particular problem.376
It is clear that, in the near future, action needs to be taken to clarify the
ambiguities of Sony's language and to resolve the split among the circuits-
whether that action is the Supreme Court accepting another case based on
Sony or Congress stepping in to draw clear lines.377 The alternative to this
will be confusion and a lack of trust in the system by those building the
technologies and industries of tomorrow.
A bright spot on the horizon for peer-to-peer software is BitTorrent,
which received $8.5 million in venture capital investment in September
2005.378 BitTorrent is more decentralized than any previous peer-to-peer
system. In addition to there being no centralized indexing server, requests
for files are distributed, with portions of the file coming from any number of
end users' computers.379 Some have estimated that BitTorrent traffic ac-
counts for nearly half of the traffic on the Internet.38 Additionally, Bertels-
mann subsidiary, Warner Brothers, announced in January 2006 that it is
launching a German P2P service for downloading movies.38' Bertlesmann is
the same company that acquired Napster's assets in 2002 for eight million
dollars and relaunched Napster as a tool for legal music downloads. 382 This
374. TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 196 (1999).
375. Id.
376. "One of the areas I am looking at is security... how to use P2P in enabling [distri-
bution], but also in business, how to shut down P2P networks, how to hack the hackers."
Telephone interview with Keith Benjamin, supra note 368. "What we have been looking at is
how to use this as a part of a solution, not simply just because it is P2P, but the less obvious
prospects of P2P, particularly in the security space." Id.
377. In response to my asking Justice Breyer whether he "believed it time for the legisla-
ture to step in" to resolve the ambiguities of third-party liability, he indicated that he thought
it "a job for Congress and not for the Court." Justice Breyer Lecture, supra note 306.
378. BitTorrent Gets $8.75M, RED HERRING, Sept. 27, 2005, available at
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a--13743.
379. Post, Bridy & Sandefur, supra note 341, at 235 n.97.
380. BitTorrent Gets $8.75M, supra note 378.
381. Warner Debuts P2P Film Service, RED HERRING, Jan. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a= 15522.
382. Post, Bridy & Sandefur, supra note 341, at 235; Warner Debuts P2P Film Service,
supra note 381.
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move may signal a realization by the entertainment industry of the need to
compromise, or it may simply be a capitulation by developers in the face of
Grokster 111's precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Gordian knot that is copyright in a digital age will not be easily un-
tied. The balance between protecting the property of copyright owners and
allowing innovation is not easy to achieve. Nonetheless, over the course of
two decades, the policy balance articulated in Sony has started to degrade as
different courts have interpreted and applied its safe-harbor analysis differ-
ently. Congress has failed to act, and the Supreme Court in Grokster III had
an opportunity to affirm the balance struck in Sony-to allow innovation to
flourish while providing ample protection for copyright holders." 3 The
Grokster III Court did not affirm that balance, and in so doing, allowed the
uncertainty surrounding Sony's application to remain, while simultaneously
adopting an inducement standard for third-party liability for copyright in-
fringement-handing copyright owners a new tool that could be used to
gratuitously stifle innovation. Until the policy balance forged in Sony is af-
firmed, the climate will not be safe for new technologies.
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